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Abstract. In this paper we apply the constructor-theoretic approach to the theory
of constructed emotions, showing that core affect valence and knowledge can be
considered as two different observables, leading to information or superinformation
conditions: this depends on subject’s strategy, coherently with the affect infusion
model. In the second part of the article we show that additional hypotheses on
the structure of information allows to study emotions in terms of the contructor-
theoretic version of phase task. Quantum algorithms are presented as an example
of the connection between emotions and memory tasks.
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1. Introduction
We know that emotions not only influence the quality of our life, but they also determine
the substance of our perceptions and actions, or, in other words, the context. Moreover,
they are real, and thus they must correspond to some physical property.
Constructor theory is a new mode of explanation in fundamental physics, first
sketched out by David Deutsch [1], expressing physical laws exclusively in terms of
what physical transformations are possible versus which are impossible, and why. By
allowing such counterfactual statements into fundamental physics, it allows new physical
laws to be expressed, for instance those of the constructor theory of information. The
fundamental elements of the theory are tasks, abstract specifications of transformations
in terms of input/output pairs of attributes. A task is impossible if there is a law of
physics that forbids its being performed with arbitrarily high accuracy, and possible
otherwise. When it is possible, there exsists a constructor, an entity which can cause
the task to occur while retaining the ability to cause it again. Examples of constructors
include a heat engine (a thermodynamic constructor), a catalyst (a chemical constructor)
or a computer program controlling an automated factory (an example of a programmable
constructor).
It is clear that such innovative and general approach may find applications also in
the study of human cognition and emotions. As written by Lisa Barret, one of the most
influential researches in affective science [2], every human thought, feeling, and behavior
must be causally reduced to the firing of neurons in the human brain, or, in more general
terms, to specific transitions of physical subsystems in human brain. Thus, in costructor
theory of cognition (which finds a first approach in [3]), subjects are constructors of
their cognitive tasks, performing transformations on the brain (considered as a general
physical system storing information). This approach results to be very general and
it evidences that human judgements make use of a specific type of information, the
superinformation. It is clear that such fact may have consequences in modeling human
reasoning and artificial intelligence. The fact that quantum information is a kind of
superinformation somehow evidences that the previous attempt to develop a quantum-
like theory for human cognition (see for example [4, 5]) was a possible way, even if
not fully justified: there may be other superinformation theories which are required by
human cognition.
The use of concepts taken from superinformation in cognitive psychology is new
and it may open new perspectives. For example, the study of emotions in cognitive
psychology introduces problems and difficulties that superinformation theories may help
to treat. It is clear that our considerations are somehow driven by analogue concepts
from quantum computation: even if quantum theory is not required, it may help to
guide our attempts to work with superinformation.
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2. Emotions
What is an emotion? This question is central to psychology and it is pervasive in
scientific models of the mind and behavior. Emotions are seen as the causes, mediators,
or effects of other psychological processes such as attention, memory, and perception.
Even if there are unresolved disagreements over the fundamental question of how an
emotion is to be defined, there is general consensus about the definition of emotion in
terms of responses to events that are important to the individual: in other words, they
are subjective experiences based on feeling pleasure or pain.
In the following, we briefly present the most important theories and experimental results
relevant to emotions, evidencing how the constructor theory of cognition can be used.
Until the 60’s, the scientific approaches to emotions focused on the interplay
between body’s physiological reactions and emotions, passing from a causal relation
(James-Lange theory [6, 7] at the end of the 19th-century), to a substantial independence
(Cannon-Bard theory [8]), up to Schachter and Singer’s two factor theory [9].
In the 1960s, Arnold [10] developed a new cognitive approach, where the first step in
emotion is an appraisal of the situation ( the cognitive processes preceding the elicitation
of emotion). According to Arnold, the initial appraisal starts the emotional sequence
and arouse both the appropriate actions and the emotional experience itself. Thus
the physiological changes, recognized as important, accompany, but do not initiate,
the actions and experiences. Lazarus [11] followed Arnold’s approach, developing a
more articulated appraisal theory, where appraisal mediates between the stimulus and
the emotional response, and it is immediate and often unconscious. In contrast to
the SchachterSinger [9] theory of emotions, which views emotion as an outcome of
the interaction between physiological arousal and cognition, Lazarus argued that the
appraisal precedes cognitive labeling, simultaneously stimulating both the physiological
arousal and the emotional experience itself.
Several influential modern models (for example [12]) have preserved the original
darwinian assumption that there are different kinds of emotion, each causing a distinct
pattern of physiological and behavioral response. In the starkest form of such models,
each kind of emotion is biologically basic, a separate, inherited, complex reflex that
is hardwired at birth. Many models assume that each emotion kind is characterized
by a distinctive syndrome of hormonal, muscular, and autonomic responses that are
coordinated in time and correlated in intensity.
However, in these last years, research has progressed from thinking about
psychological phenomena as unitary faculties (entities) of the mind to thinking about
them as emergent phenomena that vary with the immediate context. In fact, there
is accumulating empirical evidence that is inconsistent with the view that there are
kinds of emotion with boundaries that are carved in nature [2]. This leads to what
Barrett calls the emotion paradox, which evidences that our discrete commonsense
categories of emotion, like ”anger”, ”sadness”, and ”happiness” can’t find consistent
experimental support for their existence. Instead, the empirical evidence suggests that
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what exists in the brain and body is a simpler and more primitive element, the affect,
and emotions are constructed by multiple brain networks working in tandem [13]. The
theory of constructed emotion [14] was proposed by Barrett to resolve such paradox.
She draws an analogy between the categorisation process in emotion perception and
colour perception: even if the retina registers light of different wave lengths and the
spectrum of wavelengths as a continuum, yet people perceive categories of colours (red,
green, yellow, blue) depending on previously acquired conceptual knowledge. The same
happens with emotion: whether people categorise an episode of core affect as anger,
fear, or sadness depends on acquired conceptual knowledge (emotion scripts).
It is clear that the approach of theory of constructed emotion may have some points
in common with a contructor-theoretic approach. In the following subsections we focus
on the most important concepts of such theory of constructed emotion. An important
question, considered in [15], is how emotions inform judgment and regulate thought.
2.1. Core affect
Psychological construction theories hypothesize that emotions are created as the
interpretation of affective changes. They integrate dimensional and categorical
perspectives, in the following way: it is hypothesized that all emotional events, at their
core, can be described as having psychologically primitive affective properties, which
form the dimensional aspect of the theories. Psychological construction theories also
propose, however, that people automatically and effortlessly use some type of mechanism
to these affective changes meaningful in relation to objects and events in the world; this
is the categorical aspect of the theories.
According to such view, scientists are able to assess a persons affective state
(i.e., pleasure and displeasure) by more indirect or objective means [16] , but these
measurements cannot be used to assess feelings of anger, sadness, fear, per se.
Experimental measurements coordinate around positive versus negative affect [17] or
intensity of affect, rather than discrete emotion categories. This supports the emerging
notion that emotions consist of affective, valenced (i.e., positive and/or negative)
reactions to meaningful stimuli, as explicited in theory of constructed emotions [13]
We can thus move our focus from the list of emotions to the more primitive concept
of core affect. According to Russell [18], core affect is the neurophysiological state
consciously accessible as the simplest raw (nonreflective) feelings evident in moods and
emotions. Core affect is primitive, universal , and simple (irreducible on the mental
plane). It can exist without being labeled, interpreted, or attributed to any cause. As an
analogy, we can consider felt body temperature: just like for core affect, you can note it
whenever you want; felt temperature exists prior to the concept of temperature, either
in folk or scientific theory, and prior to any attribution about what is making you hot
or cold.
At a given moment, the conscious experience (the raw feeling) is a single integral
blend of two dimensions:
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• the valence, which summarizes, at the level of subjective experience, how well one
is doing, ranging from a positive state (pleasure) to a negative state (displeasure);
• the arousal (activation) property, ranging from maximal activation (agitating) to
deactivation (quiescent). At the level of subjective experience, it refers to a sense of
mobilization or energy. A person senses being somewhere on a continuum ranging
from, at the low end, sleep through drowsiness, relaxation, alertness, activation,
hyperactivation, and finally, at the opposite end. frenetic excitement. Subjective
feelings of activation arc not illusions, but a summary of one’s physiological state.
Still, the relation between the relatively simple subjective experience of activation
and its actual complex neurophysiological substrate is poorly understood; we return
to this topic shortly. Activation
The real bipolar structure of core affect has been challeged (see [19] for a review).
Even pleasant and unpleasant affect, which represent bipolar opposites, may show an
empirical independence. We will see in section (5) how construcotr theory is able to
treat this fact, by using the concept of attributes and variables.
Core affect can be experienced in relation to no known stimulus, in a free-floating
form, as seen in moods. However, core affect can be induced by a stimulus. The affective
quality [18] is the capacity of such stimulus to change core affect. Perception of affective
quality is a perceptual process that estimates this property. It begins with a specific
stimulus and remains tied to that stimulus.
Attribution of affect is the perception of causal links between events and allows
room for individual and cultural differences. Attributions usually seem correct to the
attributor, but research has demonstrated misattributions. Attributed affect is thus
defined by three necessary and, when together, sufficient features: (a) a change in core
affect, (b) an Object, and (c) attribution of the core affect to the Object.
2.2. Measurements of emotions
Even if, from an intuitive perspective, it should be easy to determine whether someone is
experiencing a particular emotion, scientific evidence suggests that measuring a persons
emotional state is one of the most vexing problems in affective science [20].
We can consider two main types of measurements of emotion.
• Physiological measurements (like EEG, neuroimaging electrodermal and other
autonomic studies), which don’t require that subjects conscously evidence their
emotions. Actually, it seems that there not exist autonomic signatures for discrete
emotions: instead, relevant studies often point to relationships among dimensions,
particularly those of valence and arousal, and autonomic nervous system responses.
For what concerns EEG, measurements appear to be sensitive to the dimensions of
approach and avoidance, but in general neuroimaging methods need more effort to
examine interrelated activity among multiple brain regions, since emotional states
are complex and involve circuits.
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As noted in [21], variation is the norm for autonomic measurements taking during
emotion. Although some writers have made a very persistent case for the existence
of autonomic signatures, actual meta-analytic summaries do not support such
claims. A meta-analysis [22], for example, summarized findings from over 200
experiments measuring autonomic reactivity during instances of emotion categories
and failed to find distinct autonomic fingerprints for any emotion category.
• Self-reports of emotion, where subjects have to rate (on a scale of points, eventually
also identified by specific labels) their mood (or their satisfaction) after a specific
preparation. These measurements are likely to be more valid to the extent that
they relate to currently experienced emotions. Even in this case, though, there are
concerns that not all individuals are aware of and/or capable of reporting on their
momentary emotional states.
We can always describe self-reports measurements in terms of a judged value J(A)
ranging from the minimum to the maximum value of a specific scale, where A is the
affect. We can also rescale, if necessary, it in a different range. We can somehow
consider such judgements in the same way as other judged values, such as the
subjective likelihood of an event.
In theory of constructed emotion there is no objective way of determining when
someone is, or is not, in a particular emotional state, and thus the measurement of
emotion via self-report is a good technique [13].
Self-reports, on their own, have limitations, of course, because they only capture
some instances of emotion (those of which the respondent is aware); in this view,
as is the classical view, people may not be conscious of the emotion they have
constructed (although for an entirely different set of theoretical hypotheses). But
when self-reports do not correlate with more objective measures, the self-reports
are not necessarily assumed to be inaccurate. Moreover, because emotion concepts
are integral to the construction of emotional experiences and perceptions, words
and other symbols that prime emotion concepts (ie, that launch predictions and
simulations) will influence what is experienced and felt. As a consequence, self-
reports of emotional experience are influenced by the words that we give respondents
to communicate their experiences or perceptions. It is possible to change a persons
feeling merely by the type of measurement instrument you give them. And
respondents will use the measure you give them to report what they want to tell
you, which may not necessarily match what you are asking (eg, if a respondent feels
excited, but you ask if he/she is happy, the respondent will use the item to tell you
how excited he/she is).
2.3. Empirical effects - feeling biases
A feeling (or emotional) bias is a distortion in cognition and decision making due to
emotional factors. Effects of emotional biases can be similar to those of a cognitive bias,
it can somehow be considered as a subcategory of such biases. The specificity is that
Constructed emotions and superinformation: a constructor-theoretic approach 7
the cause lies in one’s affects, which divert the attention of the person, more than in
one’s reasoning. Accoding to such feeling-as-bias-inducer paradigm, individuals feelings
induce various forms of bias into the decision-making process that skew their decisions
in certain ways. As summarized in [23], the first robust evidence is the following:
E1: people’s judgments about an event X don’t reflect in a clear and unambiguous way
information about it: they are also influenced by information from their own affective
reactions.
In other words, any external event X is clearly independent from subject’s emotions,
but judgements about X are influenced by emotions. More specifically experimental
manipulations of affect valence (by focusing on specific information or emotions, by de-
signing social situations, or with music) influence in a mood congruent way subject’s
judgements, for example of undesirable events [24, 25], of life satisfaction [26] or of ad-
vertisements [27]. Such infuence is independent of the similarity between the object X
and the element which elicits the emotion [24]. In studies about anxiety, the correla-
tion with judgements seems to be restricted to objects that are self-relevant [28]: the
anxiety-congruent judgements do not extend to events happening to others.
A second important evidence is relevant to the situations where such affective in-
fluence disappears:
E2: the affective influence of judgements is eliminated when subjects focus their at-
tention to their current feelings
This experimental fact evidences that there are specific situations where subjects are
able to manage separately information about emotions and about external events. For
example, this happens when people attribute their current feelings to the correct causes
[29], if participants are explicitly aware of the source of their feelings [26] or they are
asked to base their evaluations on facts rather than feelings or to rate their anxiety [25],
or when the judged object has an unambiguous affective tone [27].
For what concerns arousal, experimental manipulations, independently from
valence, lead to more polarized judgements (in direction of the objects affective tone)
[27]. However, in thisd article we will focus only on valence effects.
2.4. Affect infusion model
The Affect infusion model (AIM) is a theoretical model in the field of human psychology,
developed by Forgas in the early 1990s [30].
Let us consider a generic situat ion, where subjects have to perform a judgement
about a set of N items: for example, they may have to judge how likely they will found
items with a specific property X . They have to ckeck each of such N items and count
which have this property. If N is big or there aren’t strong motivations or resources,
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subjects may search different strategies.
The AIM assumes that the nature and extent of mood effects on judgments largely
depend on what kind of processing strategy is adopted by a judge. Such strategiies can
be classified into:
• low affect infusion (direct access or motivated processing): they involve direct
retrieval of a preexisting stored evaluation or highly selective, guided, and targeted
information search;
• high affect infusion (heuristic or substantive processing): when judges have neither
a prior evaluation nor a strong motivational goal to help to determine the outcome,
they consider only some of the available information, using whatever shortcuts or
simplifications are readily available to them.
3. Constructor theory of information: basic definitions
Why constructor theory? By focusing on what physical transformations are possible
versus which are impossible, constructor theory introduces very useful counterfactual
statements into fundamental physics.
Actually, constructor theory is based on the following definitions:
• substrate (S): a physical system some of whose properties can be changed by a
physical transformation;
• constructor : an agent causing the transformation of a substrate, whose defining
characteristic is that it remains unchanged in its ability to cause the transformation
again;
• state (ψ): a possible configuration of properties of a substrate;
• attribute (x): a set of all the states in which a specific property is true;
• variable (X): a set of disjoint attributes of the same substrate: the specific
subsidiary theory will determine how to group attributes into a variable;
• sharp state: when a substrate is in a state with attribute x ∈ X , we can say that
such substrate is sharp in X ;
• task (T ): a specifications of physical transformations affecting substrates. Different
types of transformations will be identified as specific tasks.
We recall the basic principle of constructor theory: all other laws of physics are
expressible entirely in terms of statements about which physical transformations are
possible and which are impossible, and why. Consequently, the element discriminating
between two theories will be understanding which tasks are possible and which are not.
Clearly, a key element in constuctor theory is the task. A constructor is capable
of performing a task T if, whenever presented with substrates having an attribute in
In(T ), it delivers them with one of the corresponding attributes from Out(T ) (regardless
of what it does if the substrate is in any other state). On the contrary, the task T is
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impossible if there is a law of physics that forbids it being carried out with arbitrary
accuracy and reliability by a constructor.
It is clear that the analysis of possible and impossible task is of fundamental
importance in developing subsidiary theories. We can design different specific tasks,
but some fundamental are common in all theories:
• permutation task : a task which is able to perform, with or without side-effects, a
permutation over some set of at least two possible attributes of some substrate:
CΠ(S) ∪x∈S {x→ Π(x)}; (1)
In case of a binary variable, the permutation task is equivalent to the NOT gate
or swap, which changes 0 in 1 and 1 in 0.
• cloning task : a task which is able to take {x} and {x0} in S
⊕
S , where x0 is
some fixed (independent of x) attribute with which it is possible to prepare S from
generic, naturally occurring resources, and transform them in two sets {x}. In
formula:
RS(x0) = ∪x∈S{(x, x0)→ (x, x)}; (2)
• distinguishing task : a task which maps a variable into another clonable one:
D(S) = ∪x∈S{x→ ix}; (3)
Being able to distinguish between different attributes is important. Moreover, it
allows to introduce the bar -operation x¯ =
⋃
a:a⊥x a which is the union of all the
attributes distinghuishable from x. Another definition based on the notion of
distinguisghability is the attribute uX =
⋃
x∈X x. Following the example of the
Ellsberg paradox [31], let us consider an urn containing 30 black balls and 30
yellow balls: uX describes the state when we extract a ball from the urn, since
it is the union of each specific possible extractions. Moreover, u¯X represents the
generalization in constructor theory of the notion of subspace. Following the same
example, we now don’t how many black or how many yellow balls there are, but the
total number of black balls plus the total number of yellow equals 60. In this case,
u¯X represents not only all the possible configurations of yellow and black balls, but
also, when admitted in the model, other emotional states, consistently with the
concept of knittian uncertainty (see for example [32]) .
• measuring task : this task describes in constructor-theoretic terms the measurement
operation.
MS(x0) = ∪x∈X{(x, x0)→ (yx,
′ x′)}; (4)
When X is sharp, the output substrate ends up with an information attribute x
of an output variable, which represents the abstract outcome it was x. On the
contrary, if the initial state is non-sharp, the result of the measurement can be one
of the possible values of X .
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• preparation task : given a substrate S with a binary variable X with attributes
x0, x1, the preparation or fixed task is
Tx = ∪ψ∈S{(x0, ψ)→ (θx, x)} (5)
whose meaning is simple: the initial state ψ changes into x, while x0 is a generic,
receptive attribute in another substrate which interacts with the other becoming
θx (after the preparation, such substrate can be discarded).
• identity task : it leaves unchanged any state and each attribute x ∈ X for every
variable X of the same substrate. It can be applied both on superinformation and
on classic information media.
Tasks may be composed into networks to form other tasks, as follows. The parallel
composition A ⊗ B of two tasks A and B is the task whose net effect on a composite
system is that of performing A on M and B on N . When Out(A) = In(B), the serial
composition BA is the task whose net effect is that of performing A and then B on
the same substrate. A regular network of tasks is a network without loops whose nodes
are tasks and whose lines are their substrates, where the legitimate input states at the
end of each line are the legitimate output states at its beginning. Loops are excluded,
because a substrate on a loop is a constructor.
In constructor theory we can identify specific situations based on the allowed tasks.
This helps us to quickly specify the actual situation.
• computation variable: a set of two or more attributes for which a reversible
computation is possible;
• computation medium: a substrate with at least one computation variable;
• information variable: a clonable computation variable;
• information medium: a substrate that has at least one information variable;
• information observable: an information variable X for which, whenever a measurer
of X delivers a sharp output x, the input substrate really has the attribute x.
Observables have the property that x¯ = x.
• superinformation: an information medium with at least two information
observables that contain only mutually disjoint attributes and whose union is not
an information observable.
3.1. Non-sharp states
Clearly working only on sharp states is not very useful. A strategy for studying non-
sharp states, described in [33], is to consider multiple instances of the observable X of a
substrate S. In fact, since an observable is also an information variable, we can consider
multiple instances of it. Thus we can define a counting task
−→
D(N)x which outputs the
fraction of instances of S on which X is sharp with value x. If N →∞, the attributes
output of
−→
D(N)x define the X-indistinguishabilitiy class (the set of all attributes with the
same X -partition of unity): any two attributes within that class cannot be distinguished
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by measuring only the observable X on each individual substrate, even in the limit of
an infinite ensemble.
If all the measurements give us the same value x, we have a X-indistinguishability
equivalence class denoting the sharp state x. On the contrary, if, given a state z, different
measures of the observable X lead to different values, we have a non-sharp state and a
particular X-indistinguishability class. We call z a generalized mixture of X when it is
indistinguishable for any x ∈ X and {u¯X , uX} is sharp in z.
These indistinguishability classes allow us to define the concept of X-partition of
unity as [fx]x∈X , with fx ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
x fx = 1 for any state of the substrate, even for
generalized mixtures. The real numbers fx are not probabilities at ther moment, they
only form an array of real numbers whose sum is 1, thus defining labels of equivalence
classes.
3.2. Superinformation
We recall from [33] the definition of superinformation: an information medium with
at least two information observables that contain only mutually disjoint attributes and
whose union is not an information observable.
Superinformation shows some important properties, as described in [33]: 1)
not all information attributes of a superinformation medium are distinguishable; 2)
it is impossible to measure whether the observable X or Y is sharp, even given
that one of them is; 3) superinformation cannot be cloned; 4) pairs of observables
are not simultaneously preparable or measurable; 5) superinformation media evolve
deterministically yet unpredictably; 6) measuring one observable causes an irreducible
perturbation of another; 7) for any arbitrary subsidiary theory that conforms to
constructor theory, consecutive non-perturbing measurements of an observable, even
if it is not sharp, yield the same outcomes.
Clearly, it is very important to identify situations where the substrate supports
superinformation or information. In quantum physics, the union of two sets of
orthogonal states of a qubit instantiates superinformation. In [3] it is shown an
example, taken from a famous cognitive bias, the conjunction fallacy, where human
substrates managing data instantiate superinformation. We can see that models using
superinformation generally share the same puzzling features.
We now prove a simple general property of information and superinformation: given
two observarvables X and Y of an information medium, we have the following property
of the relevant to the partitions of unity:
∀x ∈ X, y ∈ Y : fx,y ≤ fx, fx,y ≤ fy (6)
This can be demonstrated by noting that for an information medium we can measure
simultaneously both X and Y , for any copy of the original substrate. Thus if we count
the number of copies where specific values x and Y are observed, such number is always
lower or equal than the number of copies for only a single attribute x or y. Cleary, when
condition 8 is violated, we have a superinformation medium.
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3.3. Conditional task
A conditional task for two substrates S1 and S2 acts for example on a variable X
(2)
of the second substrate conditionally on specific values of a variable X(1) in the first
substrate:
CT = {(0, I(X(2)), (1, T (X(2))))} (7)
where I is the identity task for the second substrate, while T is a generic task for the
same substrate. The simplest example is the CNOT task for binary variables, where T
is a swap task.
We now consider conditional tasks for classical information and superinformation
media.
• In classic information case, the conditioning task for two events X(1), X(2) in two
different substrates is a task which acts on the second substrate only if the attribute
of X(1) has a specific value, for example x
(1)
1 .
• In superinformation case, we have in each substrate two complementary observables
X(1), Y (1) andX(2), Y (2). The conditioning task could be driven in the first substrate
from X(1) or Y (1) and similarly in ther conditioned substrate. In the following, we
consider different conditioning situations: direct conditioning, whereX(1) conditions
X(2) (or similarly Y (1) conditions Y (2)), and indirect conditioning, with observables
X(i)Y (j) involved (with i 6= j). These kind of conditioning are very important
in constructor theory of emotions, since observables X and Y will represent the
knowledge of an external event and the core affect valence respectively.
4. Constructor theory of cognition
We now briefly recall the main points of constructor theory of cognition, as originally
intrdouced in [3].
• The first hypothesis is that every human thought or emotion is represented by
neurophysiological states, which are specific physical configurations in the brain.
The substrate is the part of human brain where such thoughts are encoded and
managed. It is not importsant in this context if such portion of brain is localized
or widespread in the brain and we don’t reduce cognitive processes simply to the
firing of neurons in the human brain. We simply state that thinking or knowing
something corresponds to different neurophisiological states.
• The attribute is a neurophysiological state with a specific property (in cognitive
terms): for example, knowing something, being happy, thinking to something. This
very general approach of constructor theory helps us to carefully evidence additive
hypotheses of the model.
• The variable is a group of attributes designed in a convenient way to manage the
knowledge of facts. For example, we identify as X the binary variable describing
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the knowledge that an event X is true or false. The structure of a variable may
depend on the context: for example, different colors can be consdered as attributes
of the variable color. However, it is known that in different cultures colors are
categorized in different ways. We will see that variables are important salso in the
study of emotions: in some cases, attributes relevant to the affect valence can be
grouped to form a variable, while in other cases they don’t form a vartiable.
Generally speaking, it is not convenient to group in the same variable attributes
which are difficult to manage together. In the following, we will add definitions
which will help in this perspective.
• Any human change of thought or feeling can be made in correspondence with tasks
of constructor theory. In fact, tasks are transformations of substrates.
• Every subject is a constructor for his cognitive tasks.
The basic principle of constructor theory, reframed in cognitive context, states
that all the laws of cognitive science are expressible entirely in terms of statements
about which physical transformations are possible and which are impossible, and why.
Clearly, the constructor theory helps us to distinguish between different situations where
some tasks are possible or not.
The second principle [33] states in constructor-theoretic form Einsteins principle of
locality: there exists a mode of description such that the state of the combined system
of any two substrates S1 and S2 is the pair (x, y) of the states x of S1 and y of S2, and
any construction undergone by S1 and not S2 can change only x and not y. This means
in cognitive terms that different subsystems in the same brain or in different subject’s
brains can be changed without influencing reciprocally.
We now recall a third principle which has been conjectured in constructor theory
of information, the interoperability principle, which states that the combination of two
substrates with information variables X1 and X2 is a substrate with information variable
X1×X2. In cognitive terms, this means that subjects can organize the brain subsystems,
working with these combinations. For example, the state ψ of a subject can be the
collection of different attributes of many variables ψ = (x1, x2, ...) which describes the
fact that in the same time the subject is able to take into account different elements of
knowledge, affect...
We now review the previously defined tasks in cognition context.
• permutation task CΠ(S): it describes the human capability to change the focus on
different concepts in a given set. For example, thinging to color red, then blue
and then again red. A substrate for which permutation is possible on at least one
variable is a computation medium;
• cloning task RS(x0): it allows to replicate one neurophysiological state of a portion
of brain on other portions. It is clearly of fundamental importance in the rational
reasoning, where subjects can rethink to something and cosider it from a different
point of view. When a variable is clonable, we have an information medium. On the
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contrary, when a variable is not clonable, the subject can’t replicate such variable,
which is fleeting;
• distinguishing task D(S): when possible, it remaps the knowledge of something in
another frame which allows cloning. Distinguising it is at the basis of metaphores
and conceptual mapping. For example, when we have a binary variable, we often
describe it in terms of on/of,ok/ko or 0, 1, clearly using variables from other
contexts. In these cases, we reframe the binary variable in terms of other simple
well-known categories. Viceversa, a variable is not distinguishable when the subject
cannot manipulate it in a replicable way. It is well known in psychology that being
able to reframe requires statring with a sufficiently simple set of attributes;
• measuring task MS(x0): it is the process of reading information from one substrate
and encoding it into another. The definition (formula 4) is based on its action over
the set of attributes {x} of variable X : the measurement of such states results in
encoding in the second substrate the response ’it was x ’. For such a reason, these
states are also called sharp in X and they represent situations of clear knoweledge
about X . We say that a variable X is measurable when the measuring task MS(x0)
of formula (4) exists: when the subject knows that x is true, he is able to answer
coherently.
When a subject is uncertain about an event, we have a non-sharp state for the
variable corresponding to such event: in this case, repeated measurements of the
variable lead to different possible results, which means that many copies are sampled
to measure the actual value of the variable.
There are concepts that are by definition difficult to be measured univocally, while
there are variables such that whenever the measurement delivers a sharp output
the input substrate really has that attribute: in this case we have an observable.
4.1. Judgements and bounded/full rationality regime
The concept of X-indistinguishability class defined in constructor theory is useful in
the corresponding cognition theory because it offers a simple tool to manage non-sharp
states. We recall that in cognitive context such non-sharp states represent situations
where a subject is uncertain about a specific event. Thus the set of non-sharp states
in the same X-indistinguishability class define the cognitive states of uncertainty about
X . Moreover, it is also interesting to consider how such class is build: a cloning task is
performed on the original state, and a measurement is made on each copy: in cognitive
context, this can be interpreted as a sampling over copies of the same state. In other
words, we can imagine that the mental representation of an uncertain event is replicated
many times and tested. Judgement J(x) about an uncertain event x is performed by
repeated measurements over a large number of copies of the original state, and by
finally counting the number of copies where the event results to be true. In other words,
judged likelihoods are, under precise hypotheses, equivalent to the X-partitions of unity
fx defined in section (3.1).
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As evidenced in constructor theory, judged likelihoods J(x), just as the values of
the X-partition fx, aren’t in general probabilities, but only labels of equivalence classes.
Additional conditions for them to inform decisions in the way that probabilities are
assumed to do in stochastic theories are given via the decision-theory argument [33] and
will be recalled later in this article.
In this section, we simply remark the main point of [3]: constructor theory, when
applied to cognition, helps us to distinguish between a regime of (full) rational reasoning
and a bounded rationality regime. In the first case, each observable and combination
of observables is an information medium, and we can perform cloning task on each
observable, allowing for rational judgements on any uncertain element. In bounded
rationality regime, there are couples of observables whose union is not an information
observable: in this case, we can say that specific physical subsystems of the brain (that
substrate) is a superimfornation medium. In this regime, we can’t judge correctly any
observable.
4.2. Superinformation effects in cognition
In [3] it is shown an example, taken from a famous cognitive bias, the conjunction fallacy,
where human substrates managing data instantiate superinformation. We can see that
models using superinformation generally share the same puzzling features. We now
evidence the most important consequences of managing superinformation in cognition.
This will be useful in the next section, when applied to emotions, to prove that emotions
require spuerinformation.
We provre now the following conjunction property : let us consider two information
observables X and Y that contain only mutually disjoint attributes and whose union
X ∪ Y is an information observable. Then, if subjects are able to perform a counting
task (and thus produce judgements), we have:
∀x ∈ X, y ∈ Y : J(x, y) ≤ J(x), J(x, y) ≤ Jy (8)
This propoerty can be easily explained: let be {xi} and {yj} the attributes of observables
X and Y : then we can perform a cloning task, whose action for any attribute xi, yj is:
{(xi,j , x0, y0)→ (xi, yj, xi, yj)}; (9)
This means that subjects can manage both observables by manipulating new copies to
perform measurements and rational judgements: thus we can measure simultaneously
both X and Y , for any copy of the original substrate. If we count the number of copies
where specific values x and y are observed, such number is always lower or equal than
the number of copies for only a single attribute x or y. Cleary, when condition (8) is
violated and X and Y are observables, we have a superinformation medium (supposing
that subjects are able to perform counting task).
We recall now some important properties of superinformation medium and an
interesting prediction. First of all, pairs of observables X and Y are not simultaneously
preparable or measurable: this means that subjects can’t know in the same time such
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elements. Secondly, not all information attributes of a superinformation medium are
distinguishable: this means that subjects, when managing two complementary variables
X and Y , can’t distinguish them: they are preceived as confused. This fact leads
to an important prediction at neurophysiological level: we expect that neuroimaging
techniques can’t distinguish different variables when managed in a superinformation
medium. On the contrary, the same variables, in a context of classical information
medium (thus a rational reasoning), will be distinguishable with the same neuroimagin
techniques.
4.3. Categorization
Categorization is an activity that consists of putting things (objects, ideas, people) into
categories (classes, types, index) based on their similarities or common criteria. It allows
humans to organize things, objects, and ideas that exist around them and simplify their
understanding of the world.
The catgorization task, given a specific category, can be described in the constructor
theory as a modified measurement task Catc(x, x0) = ∪x∈X{(x, x0) → (yx, χc(x))},
where χc(x) is a boolean function which is true only when attribute x is true for the
category item c. For example, variable X may identify a feature, and only some specific
values of this feature may be true for category c. When the state s is non-sharp, the
categorization task can’t give a unique answer: the concept of X-indistinguishability
classes can be applied to χ(X), leading to the concept of category judgement Jc(s).
Cleary, the structure (according to the constructor theory) of the variable X on
which the categorization process is applied is of fundamental importance. If X is an
observable, then Jc(s) can be interpreted as a classic similarity judgement. However, if
we consider a collection of variables X∪Y forming a superinformation medium, then the
process of counting the copies for which fc is true is problematic, leading to situations
similar to the conjunction fallacy (for example, the well known pet-fish problem, or
guppy effect [34]).
4.4. Substrate addition and control of coherence
As already evidenced, we can have, in the same time, different thoughts: for example
we can think to our work and simulaneously keep in mind something other. Thus
the state ψ of a subject can be the collection of different attributes of many variables
ψ = (x1, x2, ...) which represent different elements of knowledge, affect...
As pointed out in [5], when a subject answers to a question, the measurement
process encodes in a second substrate the answer, coherently with the constructor-
theoretic definition of measurement. This contrasts with earlier quantum-like cognition
theories, where the subject’s answer simply leads to a collapse of the original state.
From a psychological point of view, a subject may know a specific situation, think
differently and even answer to a question about it in a completely different way. This
means that variable X relevant to the knowledge of an event may be accompanied by
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another variable X ′ (what the subject hopes), and a third one X ′′ (what the subject
says).
Thus the cognitive system becomes larger, and needs of some internal mechasnism
of coherence. In fact, after the answer has been encoded in a specific substrate, the
subject may receive update information or continue thinking and modify the original
state, originating the cognitive dissonance [35]. The presence of internal coherence
mechanism is hypothesized also in emotion studies [29], in the form of homeostatic
cognitive strategies in affect regulation.
5. Emotions in constructor theory of cognition
We first assume the same definitions and hypotheses already taken is section (4): in
particular, every cognitive or affective state is constructed by a constructor (the subject)
on a specific substrate. It is easy to recognize that such constructor theoretic assumption
is highly compatible with the approach of theory of constructed emotions [13, 18].
Recalling Russel’s definition [18], core affect is the neurophysiological state consciously
accessible as the simplest raw (nonreflective) feelings evident in moods and emotions.
Core affect is primitive, universal , and simple (irreducible on the mental plane.. At a
given moment, the conscious experience (the raw feeling) is a single integral blend of
two dimensions: the valence, ranging from pleasure to displeasure, and the activation.
As evidenced in theory of constructed emotions, affective feelings are experiential
representations of value: an emotion is an affective state that represents appraisals
of something as good or bad: Russell calls it valence, which may assume values from
displeasure to pleasure, with different granularity.
We remember that in constructor theory an attribute is simply a state denoting
a particular configuration of the substrate. Thus we can denote as ′a′ an attribute
describing the neurophysiological state where the subject has a specific affect valence:
for example a can be pleasant state. Grouping attributes leads to the concept of variable.
However, there may be different kinds of groups of attributes, some of them with a
menaning, other without a meaning. As evidenced in section (2), in specific situations
core affect valence can be descibed in the simplest form as a binary variable A with two
sharp states: a+ is the positive valence, representing pleasure, while a− is the negative
valence, representing displeasure.
We assume that valence is also measurable: this means that subjects in a specific
valence state a are able to answer ′a′ (I’m with affect valence a). Of course, subjects can
also be in non-sharp states: the measurement over different copies may give different
values: sometimes pleasant, sometimes unpleasant. The counting task helps to define
the judged valence J(a) describing the judged perception of valence. This judgement
can assume values on a specific scale (for example, from 0 to 100) or rough judgement
in terms of labels (like form example completely good).
Similarly, we recall from constructor theory of cognition [3] that the knoweledge of
an event can be defined as a binary observable X relevant to the knowledge (or belief)
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about it X = {x0, x1}. For example, the coin is tail, or Linda is bankteller, or Bob plays
the guitar. They are binary events which can be verified and that can have unambiguous
mental representations, according to the constructor theoretic definitions.
5.1. The appearence of superinformation
Now that we have two observables X (the object) and A (the affect valence, or simply
the affect), we can ask which is the relation between them. If is known that core affect
can be object-free or object-oriented. In the first case, we also call it mood. In the second
case knowing and affect become tightly linked, and disentangling them requires methods
by which affect can be varied independently of belief [15].
Coherently with the conceptual tools introduced by the affect infusion model (AIM),
we note that in low affect infusion strategies affect can be managed as an object-free
element, even if it can produce indirect influence. On the contrary, in high affect infusion
strategies, affect is object-oriented and tightly correlated with judged events. We now
recognize from section (2.3) that evidence E1 can be formalized as:
J(x) 6= J(x|z), (10)
where variable X is the judged object, A the affect valence, and z a generalized mixture
of A. In other words, subject’s judgements about x is modified if it is conditioned by an
affective state z. However, the second evidence E2 shows that the explicit knolwedge
of affect (that is the sharp state a) leads to
J(x) = J(x|a) (11)
In fact, it is known that the simple act of consciously focusing on emotion leads to
evidence E2. We now prove a new relevant fact for information medium, the following
independence property : given a generalized mixture z of an observable A forming an
information medium with X :
∀x ∈ X, a ∈ A : J(x) = J(x|a)⇒ J(x) = J(x|z) (12)
In other words, for an information medium, if an observable is independent for any
sharp conditioning, then such independence must hold also when A is unsharp. In brief,
for an information medium we have that E2 ⇒ ¬E1. This fact can be explained by
noting that, since X and A form an information medium, they can be both cloned and
measured simultaneously. Thus we can consider multiple instances of substrate S for
such observables and perform measurements on them, leading to X (and XA)-partitions
of unit and to judgements J . Thus, since z by definition is the union of possible states
a and by hypothesis J(x) = J(x|a) the second condition J(x) = J(x|z) must be true.
The consequence of property of formula (12) is that, when it is violated, we have
a superinformation medium. We easily recognize from section (2.3) that, in many high
affect infusion situations, events E1 and E2 are true, thus entailing that the description
of emotion experiments requires the use of superinformation. In the context of the affect-
as-information hypothesis, we can conclude that affect valence is managed together
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with other events as an information variable in low affect infusion situations, and as
superinformation in high affect infusion situations.
5.2. Conditions for decision-supporting superinformation theories
Now that we know that in high affect infusion strategies the affect valence A and the
judged event X form a superinformation medium, we look for more specific relations
between such observables.
Let us start with a simple example: when we say the glass is half full/empty, we
refer to two different emotional approaches to the same situation of uncertainty about
something (for example event X). We can have a positive affect approach, where the
glass is half-full, or a negative affect approach for the half-empty. From a rational point
of view, half-full/empty states are without of meaning: in the hypothesis that X is a
binary observable (empty/fulll), we have a unique unsharp state with X-partition of
identity [fx0, fx1 ] = [
1
2
, 1
2
]. On the contrary, the presence of affect allows us to define
different non-sharp states of observable X in terms of atrributes a+ and a−, the half-full
and half-empty states.
The previous example leads us to require as additional hypotheses the conditions
for decision-supporting superinformation theories, formalized in [33] : they are the ad-
ditional sufficient conditions for the partition function fx to inform decisions in the way
that probabilities are assumed to do in stochastic theories (including traditional quan-
tum theory via the Born Rule). In other words, these define under what circumstances
the numbers fx can be used as judged likelihoods J(x) if they were probabilities. Such
conditions are given by introducing the concept of generalized mixtures of two binary
observables X = {x1, x2}, A = {a+, a−} with the following symmetry requirements
used in the decision-theory argument [33]:
• R1: x1, x2 are generalized mixtures of A and {a1, a2} are generalized mixtures of
attributes of X . This means that we consider on the same substrate two observables:
each attribute of one variable is a generalized mixture of the attributes of the other
variable.
This condition describes a specific situation of object-oriented emotion: we can’t
build affect states (about event X) on substrates separated from those relevant to
the knowledge of event X .
• R2. Sx1,x2(a±) ⊆ a±;Sa+,a−(xi) ⊆ xi, i = 1, 2, where the computation Sm,n =
.{m → n, n → m} swaps the attributes m,n of S. This means that these mixture
are symmetric by swapping thre constituent attributes.
In emotion theory, this condition requires that we can build couples of observables
forming superinformation which are symmetric under swap task: for example in
the empty/full glass, simply exchanging words empty with full leads to a swap of
the states (from pessimistic to optimistic).
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• R3: the A-partition of states x0, x1 is such that [fa+ ]X = [fa− ]X : this means that
each attribute of one variable is a generalized mixture of the attributes of the other
variable with equal weights: swapping the constituents of such mixtures doesn’t
change the indistinghuishability class of the mixture.
In the context of constructed emotion, this condition allows to build affect states
a with complete ignorance about variable X , and similarly knowledge states x
with non-sharp affect states. Moreover, the state describing the knowledge of X
represents an unsharp state for affect. Similarly, a sharp affective state is an unsharp
knowledge state.
• R4: conditions R1, R2, R3 can be applied also with substrates S ′ ⊕ S ′′ with
observables X = (X ′, X ′′) and A = (A′, A′′). There exists an attribute q that
is a generalized mixture of attributes in X and a generalized mixture of attributes
in Y such that SX(q) ⊆ q and SA(q) ⊆ q .
In the following, we assume that these conditions are true, allowing us to consider
the X-partition of unity as true probabilities and affect as an unsharp state relevant to
X . In the binary case, we can write the X-partition of unity [fx0 , fx1] as a function of
a unique parameter, that is:
[fx0, fx1 ] = [cos
2(θ/2), sin2(θ/2)]. (13)
For values of parameter θ = 2kpi (with k integer), we have the sharp state x0, while for
θ = (2k + 1)pi we have the sharp state x1. Given θ ∈ (0, pi), we have that θ and θ + pi
represent two different non-sharp states in the same X-indistinguishability class.
Thanks to the decision-supporting hypotheses, we can consider such parameter θ
as a label for indistinguishability classes. When θ = (2k + 1)pi/2, we recover the two
attributes a+ and a−, which are generalized mixtures with equal weights described in
condition R3.
In conclusion, in section (5.1) we have shown that affect requires superinformation,
and in this section we added reasonable hypotheses to describe affect.
5.3. The coin toss and the W tasks
Given a boolean observable X , we look for a trasformation which transforms any
attribute {x0.x1} into a non-sharp state in an X-indistinguishability class with equal
weights for x0 and x1. In other words, it transforms the sharp states x0, x1 into general
mixtures whose X-partition of identity is [fx0 , fx1] = [
1
2
, 1
2
], that is a change of parameter
θ of pi.
• In the case of classical information, there is a unique state µ whose X-partition of
identity is [fx0 , fx1] = [
1
2
, 1
2
]. Thus we can call such task the coin task C(x), which
acts in the following way: x0 → µ and x1 → µ. The transpose of C(x) doen’t exist,
since it would be a multivalued function.
• In the case of superinformation, there is another observable A such that X and
A aren’t preparable simultaneously in sharp states. Moreover, with the additional
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conditions for decision-supporting superinformation theories (see section 5.2), the
states a± represent non-sharp states in an X-indistinguishability class with equal
weights for x0 and x1. Thus we can define the new task W as
W = {x0 → a+, x1 → a−} (14)
This task, which is a special kind of distinguishing task, can be considered as
the constructor-theoretic generalization of the Walsh-Hadamard gate in quantum
computation context. The transpose (the task with all the input and output states
swapped) of W is of course W∼ = {a+ → x0, a− → x1}. What we are describing is
a reversible physical transformation which transforms some sharp states into non-
sharp states, and viceversa. We underline the fact that the coin task C, differently
from W, W∼, doesn’t admit the transpose.
The existence of W task is very important in studying emotions. It describes a
typical evolution of subject’s belief about an observable from centainty to uncertainty
(and viceversa): for example if we toss a coin which has an initial value x0 (or x1),
subject’s belief about the outcomes will be a generalized mixture of x0 and x1 with two
different affective values.
However, it is clear that there may be other possible evolutions of the initial state. In
the following section, we will introduce another important element to better understand
emotions.
5.4. The phase task and emotion valence
We now introduce in constructor theoretic form a task which is very important in
quantum computation, the phase task : given a substrate S, an observable X and a
state with a specific X-partition of unity, the phase task F acts on such state by leaving
unchanged the original partition of unity. In other words, the phase task defines a class
of trasformations of states which leaves them in the same X-indistinguishability class.
FX : ∪x∈X{s→ s
′ : [fx]s = [fx]s′} (15)
Let us now examine some examples:
• Clearly the identity task is a trivial example of the phase task.
• FX applied to a sharp state of X (for example x0) can change the state only in a
trivial way, since sharp states also exist in classical information.
• Given the observables {x0, x1} and {a+, a−} previously defined, there exists a
specific phase task which produces the following transformation FX(a+) = a−,
thus swapping states a±.
In other words, the phase task does not change the form of a generalized mixture in
terms of X-partition, and thus it apparently does not change judgements. However, it
introduces an affective change, which will manifest when we apply subsequently different
tasks. We thus consider some interesting serial composition of tasks W∼FW and we
show how they are able to change the X-partition of unity.
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• When F = I, we simply have W∼W = I: the serial application of task W and
its transpose is clearly the identity task. This means that subjects can mentally
simulate a coin toss and then revert the generalized mixture into the original sharp
state, without any affective change;
• When F is a swap of states y±, the sharp input states {x0, x1} are swapped. This
can be shown by considering for example an input state x0, which is transfomed
first in a+, then swappend into a− and finally into x1. In this case the X-partition
of unity changes from parameter θ = 0 (for example for input sharp state x0) to
θ = pi (output state x1). Thus the phase task has applied a phase shift of pi. This
represents a complete belief change about X due to an emotional change;
• We can consider a general case where W∼FW changes the initial state with X-
partition of unity [fx0 , fx1] = [cos
2(θ/2), sin2(θ/2)] into another state with partition
[cos2(θ′/2), sin2(θ′/2)].
We can thus conclude that the phase task can be described in terms of a parameter, the
phase θ, which acts, when combined with W task, by changing the X-partition of unit.
The phase task allows us to describe emotions in constructor theoretical terms: a change
of emotion valence is put in correspondence with a specific phase task F , which, when
combined with a second observable through task W, leads to a change of judgements of
such observable.
6. Low affect infusion strategies
In low affect infusion situations, subjects can manage feelings and belief in an
independent way. Moreover, to perform judgements about an event, they use only
information relevant to that event.
Let J(x) be the subject’s judged likelihood about event x. Affect valence a is a
variable really independent from the external event x: in terms of judgements, this means
that J(x) = J(x|a). In constructor theoretic terms, we can say that the observables
relevant to the event X and to the affect valence A form a classic information medium.
Rational subjects perform judgements only based on similar pre-stored judgements
(for example J(x) ≃ J(k) for K and X observables representing similar situations), or
on specific information about the object of judgment (motivated processing). Thus the
observable core affect is not used to perform judgements in this case, since it has no
bearing in the judged object.
6.1. Classic information and emotions
Constructor theory of information helps us to analyze the low affect infusion strategy in
terms of observables and their relations. Observables X and A form a classic substrate.
According to this strategy, subjects are able in principle to perform judgements about
their affective state A or about the event X without mixing them.
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A typical technique used to disentangle affect and knowledge is based on expliciting
how do I feel : in this way, subjects are helped to manage affect as an independent
observable. It is clear that this strategy requires the use of classical information.
According to constructor theory of information, observables A (affect valece) and X
(an event) can be managed together and also their combination is an observable. We
can clearly consider conditional tasks, as in section (3.3): the conditionsal task CT (X,A)
defines a situation where the specific knowledge of X modifies the affect: for example,
a bad news can change the affect valence, but in any moment the subject is able to
perform measurements about observables X and A. In this sense, this is a rational-like
situation, because affect, even present, can be managed separately.
We can clearly apply the same general considerations used in section (4.2), where
we defined a simple formula (8) which is required for judgements in rational regime.
Thus we have for judgements relevant to A and X forming classic information media
the condition: J(x, a) ≤ J(x) and J(x, a) ≤ J(a). For example, subjects are able to
judge more likely to win a lottery than winning that lottery and at the same time being
happy. Clearly such judgements require to use rational strategies, and are incompatble
with high affect infusion strategires, as we will see later.
7. High affect infusion strategies
7.1. Heuristic processing
We first recall from [29] the first high affect infusion strategy, the heuristic processing : it
refers to constructive but truncated, low-effort processing, which is likely to be adopted
when time and personal resources such as motivation, interest, attention, and working-
memory capacity are scarce (e.g., evaluating your friends new company car). Heuristic
processing may result in mood congruence when affect is used as a heuristic cue and it is
consistent with the affect-as-information hypothesis [23]. According to such hypothesis,
affect provides compelling information about the personal value of whatever is in mind
at the time. In other words, when making evaluative judgments, people often ask
themselves how do I feel about it?. In such cases, positive affect signals that the object
of judgment is valuable, leading to a positive evaluation, and negative affect signals that
it lacks value, leading to a negative evaluation. Thus, feelings may be used as a shortcut
to produce a judgement on a given target, as long as the feeling is perceived (rightly or
wrongly) to be evoked by the target object.
We now analyze such heuristic processing in constructor theoretic terms. We first
note that the affect-as-information hypothes can be formally written in the form of the
following equation
J(x|a) ≃ J(a|x) (16)
In other words, the affect judgement when assuming an event can be used as a judgement
of the same event when assuming that affect.
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This strategy has been found in other contexts, like for example in the inverse
fallacy [36, 37, 38, 39] for which a simple quantum-like model has been proposed [40]:
the symmetry of the inner product and a specific structure of the vector space enconding
information is able to reproduce this effect.
While in low affecty infusion strategies we can simply refer to classical information
medium, we now show that the strategy defined by equation (16) requires the use
of superiformation. Let us suppose that X and A form an information medium
and that conditions for decision-supporting superinformation theories are true: then
J(x, a) = J(x|a)J(a) = J(a|x)J(x). Thus the symmetry property (16) is true only
when J(x) = J(a), which is without meaning, because affect A and the event X mustbe
independent.
7.2. Other high influence processes - emotions and memory
High affect infusion strategies are more complex than simple heuristic processing:
for example affect priming, which suggests that affect increases access to congruent
memories, is a kind of high influence process. As evidenced in [41], affective feelings can
hurt or help decision making: this fact can be largely determined by how individuals
experience and handle those feelings in more or less functional or dysfunctional
ways: according to such feeling-as-decision-facilitator perspective, affective feelings can
improve decision-making performance by facilitating and even enabling decision-making
processes.
In order to describe such mechanisms, we have to introduce in a general way the
relation between affect and knowledge. Let be X and A complementary observables
of a superinformation medium. Clearly, we thus exclude situations where both affect
and the object are sharp states in subject’s brain substrates. On the contrary, we
consider situations where X and A together can’t form a clonable observable: a subject
can’t know them both simultaneously, and a measurement of (for example) A changes
the context and thus the real condition of X . This condition is clearly related to the
concept of emotional truth [42]: it is well known that theres a big difference between
emotional and factual truth of an experience or situation. In particular, we identified
the taskW∼FW described in section (5.4) as the task leading to emotional truth, driven
by emotion phase parameter in F .
Two previous articles [43, 44] attempted to use quantum search algorithms in the
context of human memory. The first considered phase matching conditions known for
generalized Grover’s algorithm, connecting such phase to emotion regulation strategies.
The second article used another kind of generalization, the amplitide amplification
algorithm, to explain a cognitive heuristic called availability bias. In particular, the
ease of a memory task and the estimated probabilty were connected together, with a
quadratic relation clearly connected with the quantum speedup. In this section, we focus
the attention of the internal mechanism of such algorithms, since we now have a solid
constructor theoretic definion of phase and emotion. At the core of such generalized
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algorithms [45], we can always find the repeated use of an operator −Iγ(θ)U−1Iτ (φ)U ,
where −Iγ(θ) and Iτ (φ) are inversion operators for specific states and with specific
angles. We recognize in U−1Iτ (φ)U the quantum-computational version of the serial
task composition W∼FW described in section (5.4). The main result in [45] is that
phase matching between the phase rotation of the marked state and the prepared state
γ is crucial in constructing a quantum search algorithm.
Thus we conclude that the emotional nature of phase rotation task allows us
to explain the mood-congruent mechanism (for a review, see [15]) by using the
constructor-theoretic generalizations of Grover’s algorithm together with the emotional
interpretation of phase task.
8. Conclusions
Even if there is a prior attempt to use quantum concepts to describe emotions
[46, 47, 48] (more specifically, a model of robot-specific emotions based on quantum
cellular automata and Bloch sphere-based representations), the approach proposed in
the present article is more general, since it is well grounded in constructor theory of
information.
We recall here the main results of this article: 1) the combination of constructor
theoretic concepts with the theory of constructed emotion. In particular, the
identification of core affect valence as a first observable to study - from a constructor
theoretic approach - as a physical variable; 2) the demonstraton that there are specific
situations where core affect valence and the knowledge of events require the use
of superinformation; 3) the use of additional hypotheses, taken form the decision
supporting argument, to describe emotions as a complementary observable, and the
definition of a phase task; 4) the connection between the phase task and emotion, thus
recognizing the role of emotions is quantum Grover’s algorithm and its generalizations.
In other words, this article shows, under precise and general assumptions, what
has been hypotesized in previous articles [43, 44]: emotions cannot be studied
and understood without using new conceptual instruments, like those introduced by
superinformation. Moreover, this approach shows how emotions and cognitive tasks like
memory and judgement are tightly correlated.
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